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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG J. REECE, 
Appellant, 
-v-
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, and the UNIVERSITY OF 
UTAH, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 1960 0 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant brought this action for declaratory 
judgment challenging the constitutionality of policies and 
procedures of increasing and utilizing rent at university of 
Utah married student housing. Appellant asserts that said 
policies violate due process and equal protection under the 
law. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya of the Third judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, denied 
appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted 
respondent Board of Regents1 motion to dismiss and respondent 
University of Utah's motion for summary judgment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FACTS 
On May 4, 1983, Craig J. Reece served a summons and 
complaint upon the Board of Regents of the State of Utah and 
the University of Utah. (R. 2). Mr. Reece is a law student at 
the University of Utah acting as plaintiff pro se in this 
matter. Mr. Reece and his family are residents of University 
married student housing, known as the village (hereinafter 
Village) and are subject to a rental agreement dated August 3, 
1981. (R. 2). The village is a housing project provided by 
the University of Utah as a service to married students and 
their families. The rental agreement provides for a 
month-to-month tenancy. (R. 273). Married students are not 
required to live in this housing. Mr. Reece and his family 
have voluntarily elected to live in the Village. 
The Board of Regents of the State of Utah has the 
authority to delegate powers to institutions of higher learning 
as long as that delegation is not inconsistent with state law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-2(2). Pursuant to this authority, the 
Board of Regents granted to the University of Utah the power to 
approve housing charges to students, unless the particular 
student housing is not self-supporting. (R. 279). Hence, to 
continue as a self-supporting (for definition of self-
supporting, see R. 2 79), housing system, the University of Utah 
and the Village must raise student rent occasionally to meet 
operation, maintenance and utility increases and also to 
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maintain bond debt reserves. This concept is incorporated into 
the rental agreement which states that rental rates may be 
changed. (R. 273). The rental agreement specifically states 
that utility costs may be increased due to increased 
consumption or higher utility rates by suppliers. (R. 273). 
From August 3/ 1981, until the filing of the 
complaint on May 4, 19 83, the university of Utah raised the 
rent on appellant's apartment from $244.00 per month to $302.00 
per month. (R. 8/3 3). Each time the rent was increased, Mr. 
Reece was given prior notice and an opportunity to respond. (R. 
12 3, 2 69). An increase of $58.00 over two years was necessary 
to cover inflationary costs of operation, maintenance and 
utilities. The rents collected are deposited in the System 
Revenue Account. (R. 117). This account is part of the larger 
bond system, called the University of Utah Student Housing 
System Revenue Bonds. (R. 117). This bond system was used for 
the construction of the village and certain other buildings at 
the University of Utah. (R. 117). (A full explanation of the 
University of Utah Student Housing Revenue Bonds will accompany 
Point 11 of the Argument). 
Appellant's complaint alleges that the University of 
Utah and the Board of Regents each violated his rights of due 
process and equal protection by establishing policies, 
practices and procedures in increasing and spending rent which 
were contrary to statutorily and constitutional law. He also 
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specifically challenged the construction of a new maintenance 
building located near the Village. 
Appellant moved for partial summary judgment 
concerning the legality of the new maintenance building, (R. 
25). Hearing on that motion was scheduled for July 11, 1983. 
Respondent University of Utah's counsel rescheduled the hearing 
for August 1, 19 83, and twice gave notice to Appellant of the 
change. (R. 98-99). Appellant instead appeared at the July 11 
hearing and gave no indication that he knew the hearing had 
been rescheduled. Judge Sawaya preliminarily granted 
Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment but did not 
sign the order. (R. 111). Instead he afforded the respondents 
an opportunity to explain their absence. Respondents 
subsequently did explain their absence (R. 98-104) and filed a 
motion to have appellant held in contempt. (R. 95). 
The Board of Regents filed a motion to dismiss on 
July 20, 1983, (R. 112), and the University of Utah filed a 
motion for summary judgment on July 21, 198 3. (R. 114). On 
July 2 2, 19 83, Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment, 
the Board of Regents' motion to dismiss and the University of 
Utah's motion for summary judgment were rescheduled and set for 
hearing on August 8, 198 3. On August 2, 1983, Appellant filed 
and mailed to the respondents requests for admissions and 
requests for production of documents. He did not make a motion 
for continuance pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil procedure 56(f). 
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After hearing oral argument on August 8, 19 83, judge 
Sawaya signed an order on August 15, 1983, denying Appellant's 
motion for partial summary judgment and granting respondent 
Board of Regents1 motion to dismiss and respondent University 
of Utah's motion for summary judgment. (R. 3 29). 
After this disposition, Appellant, on September 16, 
1983, peculiarly submitted another motion for partial summary 
judgment and a motion to compel production of documents. (R. 
334). The respondents believed all issues were decided by 
judge Sawaya in his August 15 ruling. (R. 385). Counsel for 
respondents prepared an order and in a hearing on October 3, 
198 3, Judge Sawaya signed the order granting summary judgment 
and dismissal. This judgment was entered on October 7, 19 83. 
(R. 368). Appellant subsequently filed an appeal to this Court 
on October 31, 1983. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BOARD OF REGENTS 
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE THE BOARD OF 
REGENTS VALIDLY DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO 
SET RENTS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH. 
The Higher Education Act of 19 69, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 53-48-1, et seq. (1981 and Supp. 1983) established a system 
of higher education which centralized the administration of 
higher education in the Board of Regents of the State of Utah. 
The purpose of that Act was to provide a more efficient and 
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economical system of high quality public higher education by 
adopting rules and regulations applicable to all institutions, 
and by delegating certain powers to the institutions 
themselves. 
(1) It is the purpose of this act to 
afford the people of the state of Utah a 
more efficient and more economical system 
of higher quality public higher education 
through centralized direction and master 
planning providing for avoidance of 
unnecessary duplication within the "system, 
for the systematic and orderly development 
of facilities and quality programs, for 
co-ordination and consolidation, and for 
systematic development of the role or roles 
of each institution within the system of 
higher education consistent with the 
historical heritage and tradition of each 
institution. 
(2) The purpose of this act is to vest 
in a single board, the state board of 
regents, the power to govern the state 
system of higher education consistent with 
the policies adopted under section 53-2-12 
and in its discretion to delegate certain 
powers to institutional councils. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-2 (1981) (emphasis added). 
The Legislature recognized the burden which would be 
placed upon the Board of Regents if it had to perform every 
aspect of management and control of the various institutions. 
Thus, the Legislature granted the Board discretion as to which 
responsibilities to delegate. Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-2(2), 
supra. There were certain responsibilities which the Board 
determined the institutions were more capable of handling. 
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The Board of Regents has the statutory authority to 
arrange its own fiscal affairs. 
There is hereby created and constituted a 
state board of regents, which board is 
empowered to sue and be sued and to 
contract and be contracted with. The state 
board of regents is vested with the control 
management and supervision of the following 
institutions of higher education in a 
manner consistent with the policy and 
purpose of this act and the specific powers 
and responsibilities granted to it.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-4 (1981). 
This provision speaks of supervision as well as 
control. Therefore, the Board of Regents can delegate certain 
responsibilies (including financing) to the institutions. 
These responsibilities are usually conditioned with guidelines 
provided by the Board of Regents. Also, the Board of Regents 
supervisory power allows it to oversee any operation when it 
deems it necessary. This concept has led to the adoption of 
many policies currently utilized by the Board of Regents. 
An important policy pertinent to the present action 
is the Auxiliary Enterprise Policy, adopted by the Board of 
Regents on April 2 2, 1975, and subsequently amended. This 
policy was reprinted in General policies of the Utah State 
Board of Regents, 120-124 (published by the Office of the 
Commissioner of Higher Education, Tterrence H. Bell, 
Commissioner, 1976)• 
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1. Auxiliary Enterprises Shall Be 
Conceptually Self-Supporting 
This policy sets forth in broad terms 
the requirements of the Board of Regents as 
related to the operation of auxiliary 
enterprises by Utah's institutions of 
higher education. Inter-collegiate 
athletic revenues and expenditures are 
excepted from this policy since a separate 
policy for those operations will be 
considered at a later date. 
Each member institution shall use this 
policy for auxiliary enterprise units 
operated on its campus. Substantial 
departures from this policy must have prior 
approval of the Board of Regents. 
The criteria used to determine whether 
or not a unit is considered an auxiliary 
enterprise is based on the description 
contained in College and University 
Business Administration. 
An auxiliary enterprise furnishes a 
service to students, faculty and stafff 
and charges a fee directly related to 
but not necessarily equal to the cost 
of the service. The public may be 
served incidentally in some auxiliary 
enterprises. Auxiliary enterprises are 
essential elements in support of the 
educational program, and conceptually, 
should be regarded as self-supporting. 
For the purpose of this policy, 
auxiliary enterprise units, therefore, 
include the followng unless otherwise 
provided by the Board: (1) bookstore, (2) 
food services, (3) housing, (4) student 
union buildings, (5) vending machine 
operations, (6) parking services, (7) 
special events centers, (8) student health 
services, (9) others that from time to time 
meet the definition of an auxiliary 
enterprise. 
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Self-supporting i s defined as producing 
suf f ic ien t revenue to cover applicable 
d i r e c t operating cos t s , a l located ind i rec t 
expenses, changes for renewal and 
replacement, debt service requirements, 
working cap i t a l needs including recovery of 
l o s s e s . 
Id. 
This policy expressly includes housing as an 
auxi l ia ry e n t e r p r i s e . I t a lso expressly gives the i n s t i t u t i o n s 
of higher education the power to operate these auxi l ia ry 
e n t e r p r i s e s . The Board of Regents at i t s May, 1980f meeting 
c l a r i f i ed the policy requiring Board of Regents1 review of food 
and housing charges only when student housing i s not 
self-support ing as defined by the Auxiliary Enterprise po l icy . 
President Gardner suggested that Board 
policy be modified to require Board review 
and approval of housing and food charges 
only in the event that student housing i s 
not self-support ing from user charges. 
Regent Newey offered a motion to request 
the Commissioner to draf t an amendment to 
the Board's auxi l ia ry policy to incorporate 
President Gardner's recommendation. He 
emphasized that those i n s t i t u t i o n s that are 
using other options as provided in the 
housing addendum adopted by the Board today 
should continue to submit t he i r proposed 
housing and food charges to the Board to .be 
subject to i t s approval. Regent Brockbank 
seconded and the motion was unanimously 
adopted. 
Minutes, Utah State Board of Regents, May, 1980. (R. 278). 
Under t h i s amendment, only housing projects not self-support ing 
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require Board of Regents1 review. 1 The Board of Regents, in 
l ine with i t s adopted pol icy, t r e a t s a l l student housing a t 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of higher education in the State of Utah as 
aux i l i a ry en te rpr i ses which must be se l f - suppor t ing . (R. 282). 
Also, both the Board of Regents and the Universi ty of Utah have 
examined the married student housing complex (v i l lage) and have 
determined tha t i t meets the def in i t ion of se l f -suppor t ing . 
(R. 282, 285). Thus, no board of Regents review for rent 
changes a t the v i l l age i s needed. 
Appellant argues tha t the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of pol icy 
regarding rent changes a t the May 19 80 meeting was ineffect ive 
under the Utah Mminis t ra t ive Rule-Making Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-4 6-1 e t seq. (1953 as amended). However, the Board of 
Regents and the University of Utah are exempt from the 
requirements of the Administrative Rule-Making Act. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46-12 (195 3 as amended) speci f ies what s teps must be 
taken. 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of 
this act, all actions heretofore or 
hereafter taken by the state board of 
regents, the state board of vocational 
education, the institutional council of any 
institution of higher education, or by any 
agency of internal governance of any 
1 This amendment was subsequently entered into the 
official policy in a compilation known as Mended policy for 
Auxiliary Enterprises Operating Revenue and Expenditutes 
effective July 1, 1982. 
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institution in the system of higher 
educationf to adopt, amend, or repeal any 
rule shall be deemed to be in full 
compliance with the provisions of this act 
if all of the following requirements are 
satisfied. 
(1) The action was taken at a regular 
meeting of or other hearing held by said 
board, council, or agency of internal 
governance that was open to the public and 
at which all interested persons were 
offered a reasonable opportunity to 
participate by submitting data, views, or 
argument either orally or in writing. 
(2) Notice of the proposed action was 
given by listing it in the official written 
agenda for the meeting or hearing, and the 
agenda was available for public inspection 
at the office of the board, council or 
agency not less than five days prior to the 
meeting or hearing. 
(3) The minutes and other records of 
actions taken under this section, and a 
copy of all rules currently in effect that 
have been adopted by the board, council, or 
agency, are maintained at its office and 
are available to the state archivist and 
open for inspection by any member of the 
public during normal business hours. 
Id. 
The Board of Regents is well aware of the 
requirements of this section and was in compliance at the 
meeting in question. Nowhere in the record has Appellant shown 
one fact which would lead to the conclusion that the Board of 
Regents did not follow Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-12. 
The Board of Regents by statute may delegate certain 
powers to the University of Utah and other institutions of 
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higher education. Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-2(2) (1981). 
However, if there is a specific law forbidding it, the Board of 
Regents can not delegate a particular power. Appellant 
suggests that this law exists in Utah Code Ann. § 53-38-1(4) 
(1981). This statute reads: 
The state board of higher education is 
authorized and empowerd on behalf of such 
institutions: ... (4) to equip, furnish, 
maintain and operate such projects and 
buildings. For the use and availability of 
the foregoing the board may impose and 
collect rents, fees and charges from 
students, faculty members, and other 
persons, firms, and corporations, both 
public and private. As used in this 
chapter, "projects" and "buildings" include 
any one or more of such facilities. 
Id. 
Nothing in this provision, however, requires the 
Board of Regents to impose and collect rents. The Board of 
Regents is authorized and empowered to equip, furnish, 
maintain, and operate buildings of such institutions. However, 
nothing here prevents the Board of Regents from delegating 
duties to the institutions of higher education. If the 
institutions of higher education fulfill this function under 
delegation from the Board of Regents, the Board of Regents is 
not abdicating its power. It is merely formulating a method of 
arranging their (institutions) financial affairs. It is 
important to read this section in conjunction with the overall 
purpose of the Higher Education Act of 19 69, Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 53-48-2 (1981), and powers of the Board of Regents, Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-48-4 (1981). These sections indicate that delegation 
is appropriate. 
The Board of Regents is not required to set rents 
because in the second sentence of § 53-38-1 above it states 
that the Board of Regents "may impose and collect rents." it 
does not say the Board "shall" set rents, use of the term 
"may," rather than the term "shall," makes procedures 
permissive and not mandatory. State ex rel. Cartwright v. 
Oklahoma, 640 P.2d 1341 (Okla. 1982). In discussing the term 
"may" in a different statute, the Utah Supreme Court in Grant 
v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971), stated: 
Foundational rules require that each term 
of a statute was used advisedly; and that 
each should be given an interpretation and 
application in accord with their usually 
accepted meaning, unless the context 
otherwise requires. In this connection it 
must be realized that, although there are 
exceptions where the context does fairly 
require otherwise, the word "may" in its 
most usual meaning does not import 
certainty, but uncertainty. This is, 
whatever is referred to, either may or may 
not be, or occur. This line of reasoning 
proceeds: that if the legislature had 
intended an applicant to have an absolute 
right of reinstatement, instead of saying 
that an applicant "may have his contract 
reinstated," it could easily have used the 
word "shall" or "must," and thus have 
rendered a mandatory meaning clear. 
Id. at 1036-37. 
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Also, the Utah Supreme Court has used the principle 
that statutes are not to be considered "mandatory" unless some 
consequences are attached to the failure to act. Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 48 Of 4 81 (Utah 1980). Here no 
penalty attaches for the failure of the Board of Regents to 
collect rents. Appellant points to no other Utah statute which 
requires the Board of Regents to establish and collect rent. 
Appellant suggests that application of the cases of 
First Equity Corp. v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 8 87 (Utah 
197 5), and Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Commission, 
657 P.2d 1289 (1982), would preclude the University from 
setting rent. However, the facts and conclusions in those 
cases are actually contrary to appellant's argument. Both of 
those cases dealt with the question whether the Legislature had 
delegated certain powers. in Intermountain Health Care, the 
court followed "the rule that the Legislature's delegation of 
the power to set rates must be in clear, express, and 
unmistakable terms." Id. at 1291. Even the appellant would 
not argue that the power to set rents is still in the 
Legislature. Also, the minimal factual similarity between the 
industrial Commission setting hospital rates and the university 
establishing rental charges for student housing renders this 
case inapplicable. Also, appellant's hypothetical comparison 
to the Public Service Commission's utility rate setting is 
meritless. utility rates affect every member of the 
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community in a specific area served, people have no choice but 
to pay increases approved by the Commission. Whereas, 
Appellant certainly has a choice as to where he lives. 
POINT II 
THE UNIVERSITY HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL 
ASPECTS OF THE BOND RESOLUTION AND HAS MADE 
NO UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFERS. 
The bond system which provides the funds for the 
construction of University village and cetain other buildings 
at the University of Utah is called the University of Utah 
Student Housing System Revenue Bonds. Within this bond system 
various accounts are established. All revenues from the 
operation of the housing system are deposited in the Systems 
Revenue Account. Bond Resolution § 4.02, (R. 183). This 
account is maintained by the University and is used to pay 
current expenses of the housing system. Bond Resolution 
§§ 4.03 and 4.04, (R. 184). 
The funds remaining in the System Revenue Account 
after the operating costs have been paid are deposited in the 
System Net Revenue and Income Fund Account (SNRIFA). Bond 
Resolution § 4.05, (R. 18 4). Funds are transferred from SNRIFA 
to the System Bond Fund to ensure sufficent money to pay the 
principal and interest payments on the bonds. Bond Resolution 
§ 4.0 7, (R. 185-188). The account for these payments is called 
the Debt Service Reserve. 
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After a l l the required funds have been t ransferred 
from SNRIFA to the Debt Service Reserve, the bond reso lu t ion 
requi res tha t $113,0 50 be t ransferred each f i sca l year to the 
System Repair and Replacement Reserve Account. Bond Resolution 
§ 4.08r (R. 188). The t ransfer does not take place if the 
System Repair and Replacement Reserve Account has a surplus of 
$2,263,500 or more. Bond Resolution § 4.08, (R. 188). Any 
funds remaining in SNRIFA af te r paying current expenses, and 
t ransfer r ing r e q u i s i t e funds to the Debt Service Reserve and 
the System Repair and Replacement Reserve Accounts may be used 
(1) t o make advance payments on Student Housing System Revenue 
Bonds, (2) to apply or accumulate a reserve for cons t ruc t ion , 
furnishing, or acquiring addi t ional or exis t ing housing 
f a c i l i t i e s or re la ted aux i l i a ry bu i ld ings , or (3) for any 
lawful purpose. Bond Resolution § 4.09/ (R. 189-190). 
The funding for the construction of the new 
maintenance building a t un ive rs i ty v i l l age came from SNRIFA 
funds as authorized by § 4.0 9 of the Bond Resolution, (R. 220). 
The construct ion of tha t building wi l l f i t e i the r category (2) 
or (3) of § 4.09 r (R. 189-190). "Hie maintenance building f a l l s 
within the de f in i t ion of "improving, rep lac ing , r e s t o r i n g , or 
equipping any exis t ing f a c i l i t i e s comprising the Housing 
System." Id . This small maintenance building wi l l ce r t a in ly 
improve the maintenance and operation of the ex i s t ing 
University v i l l a g e . 
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The operation of the bond system relating to funds 
acquired through rent follows specific state law. Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-38-6 (1981) states: 
[A]11 income and revenues derived from the 
operation of the building shall be ... 
applied solely to the payment of the 
principal of and interest on the bonds, and 
to the extent so provided in the resolution 
authorizing the bonds, to the payment of 
the cost of maintaining and operating the 
building and the establishment of reserves 
for such purposes.... 
Id. This section specifically allows the establishment of 
reserves and for the cost of maintaining and operating the 
buildings if the bond resolution so authorizes. There is 
additional support in the Utah law, from the Utah Legislature 
and from the Board of Regents for the improvement of the 
Village. Utah Code Ann. § 53-38-1*8 (1981) states: 
The state board of regents, acting in its 
capacity as the governing authority of the 
University of Utah, is hereby authorized 
[to] issue, sell, and deliver revenue bonds 
of the University of Utah for the purpose 
of paying the cost of improving and 
renovating married student housing at 
University village on the campus of the 
University of Utah in Salt Lake City, 
including the acquisition of all necessary 
appurtenant furnishings and equipment.... 
Id. This section clearly indicates authorization of both the 
Legislature and the Board of Regents for the upgrading of 
University Village. Also, the bond system and issuance was 
submitted and approved by the Utah State Auditor to assure 
compliance with Utah law and proper accounting principles. (R. 
137-139). 
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Further indications in the record support the 
assertion that the Board of Regents has approved the building 
of the maintenance building and other operating and maintenance 
costs. The Board has adopted a policy that it will review 
expenditures for cosntruction only when funds must be 
appropriated from the Legislature, when the authority to incur 
bonded indebtedness is required, or when the expense is over a 
certain amount. (R. 241-242). The policy requires an 
expenditure for new construction at the University fo Utah to 
exceed $1,00 0,00 0 before Board approval is required. (R. 24 2). 
If the amount is less than $1,000,000, Board approval is 
assumed. 
The estimated cost of constructing the building was 
$290,000; the final project cost was $360,817, well below the 
$1,000,000 limit. Thus, Board of Regents1 approval was assumed 
and specification by the Board was not required. The 
University of Utah institutional Council, which has authority 
to approve University of Utah expenditures, did approve the 
construction of the maintenance building. (R. 243). 
In addition to the maintenance building, which the 
University admits was constructed, Appellant states in 
appellant's brief at p. 2 2 that he has identified five other 
specific payments which were applied to accounts other than 
legally allowed. Appellant, in actuality, has identified no 
payments. None of these payments is supported by the record. 
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The only payment actually in the record is a $ 69,340.0 0 payment 
taken from the receipts of University Village and used to pay 
the university of Utah for their general and administrative 
expenses incurred for operating University Village. (R. 22). 
This money was not transferred to the general revenues or any 
other account of the University of Utah. (R. 221). 
Appellant asserts that a tax on married student 
housing is used to pay other University expenses. This is 
simply not true. The only example used by appellant is the 
administrative expenses of police and fire protection, and 
personnel services provided to the village by the University of 
Utah. These are expenses every private landlord passes on to 
tenants, and expenses which the village must pay as operation 
and maintenance expenses. Appellant cites Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53-38-6 as support for this assertion. However, this section 
clearly allows rent to pay for the cost of the operation and 
maintenance of buildings. It seems very clear that personnel 
services, police and fire protection constitutes operation and 
maintenance expenses. Appellant claims that by having to pay 
for these services at the Village he is being treated 
differently than other students not living at the Village. 
However, the fact is that the other students that do not live 
at the Village must pay for these types of costs at their own 
domiciles through property taxes or rent. 
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POINT III 
THE UNIVERSITY HAS NOT VIOLATED ANY 
REQUIRED PROCEDURES OR DUE PROCESS IN 
ESTABLISHING RENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY 
VILLAGE. 
Appellant correctly cites State ex rel. Summers v. 
Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1980); Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565, 576 (1976); and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 569 (1972), for the proposition that for a due process 
analysis to be made, some property interest must exist. 
However, Appellant has no such interest. The university of 
Utah is under no duty to provide housing to married students. 
It is not enforcing any federal or state housing statute, "The 
range of interests of procedural due process are not infinite." 
Board of Regents, supra at 570. 
Various types of benefits under state and federal 
statutes have been held to constitute "property" subject to due 
process requirements. In the cases of Aguiar v. Hawaii Housing 
Authority, 522 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Ha. 1974); Thompson v. 
Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and Burr v. New 
Rochelle Housing Authority, 479 F.2d 1164 (2d. Cir. 1973), all 
cited by appellant as supporting his cause, there was a federal 
or state statute authorizing or requiring low-cost housing, 
thus raising a property interest because the tenants had a 
"claim of entitlement ... grounded in the statute." Board of 
Regents, surpa at 57 7. In the present case, however, Appellant 
has no claim of entitlement grounded in statute. 
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Thus, Appellant is relegated to finding a property 
interest grounded in the rental agreement itself. (R. 273). 
It is possible for due process property rights to emanate from 
some contracts, express or implied. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 
U.S. 593, 599 (1972). However, these are very limited cases. 
Examples are cases where a person's good name, reputation, 
honor and integrity is at stake. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 
400 U.S. 433, 437 (1970). Appellant cannot claim that this is 
a situation where his good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake. Thus, procedural due process is not 
required in this case. 
Appellant's rental agreement indicates that he has a 
month-to-month tenancy. Tenancies from month-to-month are not 
continuing rights of possession but end and recommence at the 
expiration of every month. Thompson v. Gin, in and for the 
County of Pima, 566 P.2d 17 (Ariz. 1976); The Hour Publishing 
Company v. Govez, 254 A.2d 919 (Conn. 1968). It is clear that 
rent increases appliying to future leases creates no property 
interest. Riger v. L. & B. Limited Partnership, 3 63 A.2d 4 81, 
487 (1976). Further, future leases do not presently exist, and 
it is impossible to have a property interest in something that 
does not exist. If Appellant does not appreciate his rent 
being raised two months in the future under a new lease, his 
alternative is to find more suitable and more economical 
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housing in the private sectorf not to be afforded procedural 
due process. 
Even assuming for the purpose of argument that 
Appellant does have a property interest which is protected by 
due processf it is clear that the University has met due 
process requirements. It is now and always has been the policy 
of the university to act with the utmost fairness in the 
increasing of rent at the Village. 
The arm of the University of Utah responsible for 
approving financial arrangements of the University is the 
institutional Council of the University of Utah. The rents at 
the Village are discussed at meetings of the Institutional 
Council. If the increase of rent charges is to be considered a 
rule, the Administrative Rule-Making Actr Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46-12 (1953 as amended), must be followed. (See pp. 10-11 
for full text of statute). These requirements are always met 
by the institutional Council. They approve rent changes at a 
regular meeting open to the public. The public is free to 
comment on issues at these meetings. Advance notice is given 
and the minutes are available to the public in the offices of 
the institutional Council. A copy is also sent to the Board of 
Regents to keep them apprised of developments. (R. 264-26 5). 
Thus, all the requirements of the Administrative Rule-Making 
Act are met. In addition, Appellant is represented on the 
Institutional Council, by the student representative. 
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Again, assuming Appellant has a property interest, he 
believes he personally has a right to notice and to comment on 
the proposed increases. Whether he has a property interest or 
not, he is afforded notice at least two months prior to the 
time the proposed increase will take effect. (R. 269). This 
is in accord with paragraph 1(d) of the lease, (R. 269), and 
further affords the tenants adequate time to respond. Notice 
of each proposed increase complained of here was delivered at 
least 60 days prior to the rent increase. (R. 271). Every 
tenant of University Village is given an opportunity to respond 
to an increase in rent by either telling his village 
Representative, the Director of Student Family Housing, or by 
appearing before the Instutitional Council of the University of 
Utah. (R. 2 71). Tenants are notified prior to the meeting of 
the institutional Council in which it approves the rent 
increase. (R. 269f 266). Respondents are certainly creating no 
special status by this process. instead they are extending a 
service to the tenants which no citizen residing in private 
housing is afforded, and which easily fulfills due process 
requirements. 
This due process requirement of personal notice to 
Appellant is more than is required by Utah law. Setting rent 
is undoubtedly an administrative matter, and notice for 
administrative matters is more limited than in other areas of 
the law. Worral v. Ogden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 5 98, 
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602-603 (1980). In the Worral decision, only two justices 
could agree that when a public employee is discharged (an 
administrative matter much more presonal in nature than setting 
rent) the individual need be apprised of information 
"reasonably calculated to afford the informant an opportunity 
to be heard at a proper time and in a proper manner." Id. at 
601-602. The present case is much different than Memphis 
Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1978), 
where the Supreme Court held that utility customers must be 
apprised of the procedure to challenge a utility termination. 
The Craft case, like Worral, supra, represents a much more 
personal action. In that case, the customers were given little 
or no notice of the shut-off, and no opportunity to respond. 
Here, the student resident is informed over 6 0 days prior to 
the increase in rent. Furthermore, by living at the village, 
Appellant understands that he may respond to his Village 
Representative or to the Director of Student Family Housing 
about any problems with the housing. 
POINT IV 
JUDGE SAWAYA'S GRANTING OF DISMISSAL AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPROPRIATELY ENDED 
DISCOVERY. 
A g r e a t d e a l of a p p e l l a n t ' s a rgument i s based on 
f a c t s which he a s s e r t s were a d m i t t e d b e c a u s e r e s p o n d e n t f a i l e d 
t o r e spond t o h i s r e q u e s t f o r a d m i s s i o n s . (R. 2 9 7 - 3 0 7 ) , 
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356-361). On August 2, 1983, just six days prior to the 
scheduling hearing, Appellant filed Requests for Admissions and 
Request for production of Documents. Respondents received 
these requests near the end of that week and did not have time 
to compile the information by the Monday, August 8/ 1983 
hearing. At the August 8/ 198 3 hearing, Counsel for 
Respondent, university of Utah, Mr. William Evans asked judge 
Sawaya if his order would take care of the outstanding 
discovery requests. (R. 386). Judge Sawaya acknowledged that 
his order would cut off the discovery. (R. 386/ 388). In 
accord with that, judge Sawaya signed his own written order on 
August 15/ 198 3/ granting motions for summary judgment and 
dismissal, and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary 
judgment. (R. 329). When Judge Sawaya sent the parties copies 
of his order, signed by him (a common practice in the District 
Court) discovery ended. Appellant does not dispute the fact 
that a grant of summary judgment or dismissal ends discovery. 
Appellant contends that Rule 2.9(a) of the Rules of 
practice of the District and Circuits Courts requires a formal 
typewritten order be prepared by the prevailing party 
(Respondents in this case). Counsel for Respondents did agree 
to prepare this order and at a hearing on October 3/ 1983/ 
judge Sawaya agreed to sign the order. (R. 387). All parties 
signed this orderf including Appellant. (R. 368). If 
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Appellant believed the case was still pending, he should not 
have signed this order. Even Judge Sawaya was confused as to 
why Appellant appeared before him on October 3f I9 83f after the 
court had already granted the motions. (R. 386). Judge Sawaya 
could see no practical purpose in allowing further discovery 
after the motion had been granted. (R. 387). 
Appellant cites several Utah cases and Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 36(a) for his proposition that the failure to 
get a signed typewritten order from the court within fifteen 
days, extends discovery and thusf his request for admissions 
are admitted based on Respondents1 failure to respond. 
However, none of the cases cited by Appellant deal with the 
fact situation surrounding Appellant's outstanding request for 
admissions. 
This is certainly unlike Schmitt v. Billings, 6 00 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979), where an outstanding request for 
admissions was deemed admitted. In that case, the time for 
response to the request had passed before any hearing on a 
motion to dismiss was scheduled. This Court indicated that 
even scheduling a hearing would have been sufficient to stop 
the admissions from being deemed admitted. Id. at 519. 
In the case now before this court, not only was the 
hearing scheduled, it was scheduled before the requests were 
filed. Further, the motions for dismissal and summary judgment 
were granted and the judge signed a handwritten order to that 
effect. 
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This was also different than the "unsigned minute 
entry" in Wilson v. Manning, 64 5 P.2d 65 5 (1982)/ which did not 
constitute "an entry of judgment," 
The main issue in the cases which Appellant cites is 
the issue of whether the particular case was ripe for appeal. 
Wilson, supra at 656; Yusky v. Chief Consol. Mining Company, 
236 P. 452 (Utah 1925); Bigelow v. Ingersol, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 
1980). At most, the second order of October 3/ 1983/ perfected 
this case for appeal. By not answering plaintiff's request for 
admissions, the defendants were merely following judge Sawaya's 
signed order. 
The Judge did not err in disallowing Appellant any 
further discovery. Besides rendering a judgment which cut off 
discovery, the court had no motion before it to allow 
continuance of discovery as required by Rule 5 6(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. If Appellant wished his discovery 
motions to be effective at the time of the summary judgment 
hearing, he only needed to make a motion for continuance. In 
addition, Appellant filed his complaint over three months prior 
to this time, and had sufficient time to conduct discovery. 
The fact that he waited until six days prior to the hearing on 
the motions for summary judgment and dismissal indicates he was 
merely trying to delay the proceedings. 
Appellant in his brief, p. 3 2/ states he filed a 
motion for continuance. However, there is no motion for 
continuance as part of the record now before this court. 
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Further, Appellant claims that Respondents had 
exclusive possession of evidence. Most of the records 
requested by Appellant are public documents, available to 
Appellant upon his request. 
Apparently, judge Sawaya was satisfied that the 
information and evidence before him clearly absolved the 
University of Utah and the Board of Regents of any liability as 
to matter of law. Thus, allowing further discovery would have 
been cumulative, and the granting of summary judgment and 
dismissal was proper without more discovery. Howell v. 
Management Assistance, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 83 (D.N.Y. 1981). 
CONCLUSION 
The Board of Regents of the State of Utah has the 
statutory power to delegate the authority to set rents to the 
University of Utah and other institutions of higher learning. 
The Board did not violate any provision of law when clarifying 
this policy at its May, 1980, meeting. The university of Utah 
lawfully followed all necessary procedures in fixing rents, and 
the University utilized the rent collected pursuant to the bond 
resolution and state law. 
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